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Severance	  taxes	  on	  oil	  produc;on	  in	  Alaska	  
•  On	  April	  14th,	  2013,	  the	  Alaska	  State	  28th	  Legislature	  
passed	  Senate	  Bill	  21	  	  
–  A	  significant	  reduc;on	  in	  Alaska’s	  severance	  tax	  rate	  
–  hoping	  to	  s;mulate	  explora;on,	  field	  development,	  oil	  
produc;on,	  and	  job	  crea;on	  	  
	  
•  Fundamental	  tradeoff:	  	  poten;al	  loss	  of	  tax	  revenue	  
for	  purported	  gains	  in	  explora;on	  and	  produc;on	  
ac;vity	  	  
–  Key	  ques;on:	  are	  severance	  taxes	  effec;ve	  in	  this	  regard?	  
–  Li>le	  empirical	  evidence	  
Severance	  taxes	  on	  oil	  produc;on	  in	  Alaska	  
“Declining	  oil	  produc.on	  is	  not	  because	  [Alaska	  is]	  
running	  out	  of	  oil,	  but	  because	  [Alaska	  is]	  running	  
behind	  in	  the	  compe..on.	  Alaska’s	  North	  Slope	  has	  
billions	  of	  proven	  barrels	  of	  oil,	  but	  [Alaska	  does]	  not	  
have	  a	  tax	  system	  designed	  to	  aBract	  new	  investment	  
for	  more	  produc.on.”	  	  
Alaska	  Governor	  Sean	  Parnell,	  January	  15,	  
2013.	  
	  
•  Alaska’s	  severance	  tax	  reform	  was	  a	  response	  to	  
declining	  oil	  produc;on	  from	  North	  Slope	  fields	  
Severance	  taxes	  on	  oil	  produc;on	  in	  Alaska	  
•  Senate	  Bill	  21	  was	  implemented	  in	  response	  to	  
Alaska’s	  previous	  highly	  progressive	  tax	  structure	  
(ACES)	  
•  Alaska’s	  Clear	  and	  Equitable	  Share	  	  
•  Introduced	  in	  2007	  under	  Gov.	  Sarah	  
Palin	  
•  Combined	  with	  increased	  oil	  prices,	  
ACES	  more	  than	  tripled	  the	  tax	  
liability	  for	  much	  of	  the	  oil	  already	  
under	  produc;on	  in	  Alaska	  	  
Severance	  taxes	  on	  oil	  produc;on	  in	  Alaska	  
•  Supporters	  of	  Senate	  Bill	  21:	  
–  ACES	  diminished	  incen;ves	  for	  
investment	  in	  development	  and	  
explora;on	  	  
–  ACES	  led	  to	  reduced	  
employment	  opportuni;es	  and	  
oil	  produc;on	  	  
•  Opponents	  of	  Senate	  Bill	  21:	  
–  pointed	  to	  sta;s;cs	  showing	  
increases	  in	  oil	  and	  gas	  
employment	  and	  investment	  	  
–  claimed	  that	  there	  was	  no	  
evidence	  of	  ACES’	  nega;ve	  impact	  
on	  Alaska’s	  investment	  climate	  	  
Severance	  taxes	  on	  oil	  produc;on	  in	  Alaska	  
•  Evidence	  presented	  by	  both	  sides	  was	  substan;al	  in	  
volume,	  but	  its	  eviden;ary	  basis	  was	  incomplete.	  	  
–  Many	  important	  factors	  unrelated	  to	  ACES	  had	  the	  poten;al	  to	  affect	  
the	  path	  of	  oil	  ac;vity	  in	  Alaska.	  
	  
•  Failure	  to	  ask	  the	  key	  iden;fying	  ques;on:	  
How	  would	  have	  Alaskan	  oil	  ac.vity	  evolved	  
since	  2007	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  ACES?	  	  	  
•  Without	  establishing	  the	  counterfactual,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  
accept	  whether	  or	  not	  ACES	  led	  to	  any	  actual	  gains	  or	  losses.	  	  
Purpose	  of	  Our	  Research	  
•  A>empt	  to	  answer	  this	  ques;on	  through	  a	  more	  rigorous	  
approach	  	  
•  Es;mate	  the	  impact	  of	  ACES	  on	  Alaskan	  resource	  development	  
and	  employment	  	  
•  Use	  a	  compara;ve	  case	  study	  employing	  the	  synthe;c	  control	  
method	  (Abadie	  et	  al.,	  2010)	  	  	  	  
•  Construct	  a	  synthe;c	  Alaska	  from	  a	  donor	  pool	  of	  U.S.	  energy	  
states	  	  
•  Comparison	  between	  synthe;c	  Alaska	  outcomes	  with	  real	  
Alaska	  outcomes	  provides	  an	  es;mate	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  ACES	  
How	  would	  have	  Alaskan	  oil	  ac.vity	  evolved	  since	  
2007	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  ACES?	  	  	  
Background:	  Alaska’s	  Oil	  Economy	  
•  Over	  16.6	  billion	  barrels	  of	  oil	  produced	  in	  Alaska	  since	  
statehood	  
•  30	  billion	  addi;onal	  barrels	  undiscovered	  
•  Revenue	  from	  oil	  produc;on	  represented	  approximately	  93%	  
of	  all	  revenue	  in	  FY	  2012	  
•  Two-­‐thirds	  of	  economic	  growth	  since	  statehood	  a>ributed	  to	  
oil.	  
	  	  
State Tax Collections (Thousands) FY2008
Severance Taxes Total Taxes Share
Alaska $6,939,040 $8,424,714 82.4%
Wyoming 883,786 2,168,016 40.8%
North Dakota 791,692 2,312,056 34.2%
New Mexico 1,089,836 5,674,530 19.2%
Montana 347,221 2,457,929 14.1%
Oklahoma 1,184,765 8,484,227 14.0%
Louisiana 1,035,695 11,003,870 9.4%
Texas 4,131,185 44,675,953 9.2%
West Virginia 347,592 4,879,151 7.1%
Kansas 168,696 7,159,748 2.4%
Mississippi 135,248 6,618,349 2.0%
Utah 106,060 5,944,879 1.8%
Colorado 151,474 9,624,636 1.6%
Energy States 17,312,290 119,428,058 14.5%
Non-Energy States 947,347 661,897,236 0.1%
United States 18,259,637 781,325,294 2.3%
Source: U.S. Census Bureau
Appendix A
SEVERANCE TAXES AS A SHARE OF TOTAL TAXES
Background:	  North	  Slope	  Oil	  Fields	  
•  North	  Slope	  has	  seen	  considerable	  development	  
since	  the	  construc;on	  of	  TAPS	  in	  1977.	  
Background:	  Declining	  North	  Slope	  Produc;on	  
•  North	  Slope	  produc;on	  has	  been	  declining	  since	  
“peak	  oil”	  in	  1987.	  
Background:	  A	  Short	  Tax	  History	  
•  ELF	  I	  (1977-­‐1989)—progressive	  tax	  on	  gross	  revenues	  
–  Progressivity	  applied	  against	  produc;vity	  of	  the	  average	  well	  in	  a	  field	  
–  Maximum	  tax	  rate	  of	  12.25%	  (15%	  for	  fields	  >	  5	  years	  old)	  
•  ELF	  II	  (1989-­‐2006)—changed	  calcula;on	  of	  ELF	  I	  to	  
account	  for	  oil	  field	  size.	  
–  By	  2005,	  produc;vity	  in	  Kuparuk	  had	  fallen	  so	  much	  that	  effec;ve	  tax	  
rate	  was	  <1%.	  
–  Higher	  oil	  prices	  ini;ated	  new	  tax	  structure	  
•  PPT	  (2006-­‐2007)—progressive	  tax	  on	  net	  revenues.	  
–  Base	  rate	  of	  22.5%	  with	  an	  increase	  of	  0.25%	  for	  every	  $1	  increase	  in	  
net	  revenue	  per	  barrel	  >	  $40.	  
–  Credits	  for	  explora;on,	  capital	  expenditures,	  new	  area	  development	  
–  Short-­‐lived	  due	  to	  allega;ons	  of	  bribery	  and	  corrup;on	  
Background:	  A	  Short	  Tax	  History	  
•  ACES	  (2007-­‐present)—same	  as	  PPT	  except:	  
–  Base	  rate	  of	  25%	  with	  an	  increase	  of	  0.4%	  for	  every	  $1	  increase	  in	  net	  
revenue	  per	  barrel	  >	  $30.	  
–  Increase	  of	  0.1%	  per	  dollar	  above	  $92.50	  per	  barrel	  of	  net	  revnue.	  
–  Maximum	  tax	  rate	  of	  75%	  
•  Immediate	  effect	  at	  oil	  price	  =	  $100/barrel:	  
–  Triple	  the	  tax	  liability	  for	  much	  of	  the	  oil	  already	  under	  produc;on	  in	  
Alaska	  
Theory:	  Effect	  of	  Severance	  Tax	  Rate	  
•  Recent	  theory	  based	  on	  Pindyck’s	  (1979)	  model	  of	  op;mal	  
deple;on	  with	  explora;on	  and	  produc;on	  decisions	  
•  General	  lessons	  from	  increased	  severance	  tax:	  
–  Reduc;on	  in	  future	  drilling	  and	  produc;on	  
–  Reduc;ons	  are	  modest	  (i.e.	  firms	  are	  highly	  inelas;c)	  
–  Propor;onately	  more	  tax	  revenue,	  redirec;ng	  rents	  from	  industry	  
to	  public	  sector	  
–  General	  equilibrium	  effects	  (e.g.	  GDP,	  employment)	  depend	  on	  
elas;city	  of	  oil	  produc;on	  and	  drilling	  
•  But…..	  
–  Standard	  theory	  does	  not	  account	  for	  opportunity	  cost	  of	  
investment	  capital	  
–  Increased	  severance	  tax	  	  may	  redirect	  investment	  to	  more	  
favorable	  jurisdic;ons	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Are	  these	  differences	  a>ributable	  to	  ACES?	  
Iden;fying	  the	  Impact	  of	  ACES	  
•  Possible	  Solu;on:	  compara;ve	  case	  study	  
–  Use	  sufficiently	  similar	  U.S.	  states	  post-­‐2007	  that	  did	  not	  receive	  
the	  treatment	  to	  es;mate	  Alaska	  without	  ACES	  
•  Problem—We	  don’t	  observe	  Alaska	  without	  ACES!	  
–  Using	  pre-­‐2007	  Alaska	  probably	  not	  a	  good	  approxima;on	  of	  
post-­‐2007	  Alaska	  without	  ACES	  (too	  many	  confounding	  factors)	  
•  Ques;on—How	  did	  ACES	  affect	  Alaskan	  economy?	  
–  Want	  to	  compare	  post-­‐2007	  Alaska	  with	  ACES	  to	  post-­‐2007	  
Alaska	  without	  ACES	  
•  Problem—how	  does	  one	  choose	  comparison	  states?	  
–  Especially	  true	  if	  there	  is	  a	  set	  of	  mul;ple	  states	  from	  which	  to	  
choose	  
–  Diff-­‐in-­‐diff	  approach	  treats	  all	  treatment	  and	  control	  states	  as	  the	  
same	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  treatment	  
The	  Synthe;c	  Control	  Method	  (SCM)	  
•  Weights	  are	  calculated	  to	  best	  match	  the	  synthe;c	  
Alaska	  to	  Alaska	  based	  on	  pre-­‐interven;on	  
characteris;cs	  
•  A	  data-­‐driven	  procedure	  that	  creates	  a	  “synthe;c”	  
Alaska	  
–  Creates	  a	  comparison	  unit	  from	  a	  convex	  combina;on	  of	  
poten;al	  comparison	  units	  from	  a	  “donor	  pool”	  
•  SCM	  handles	  confounding	  
unobserved	  characteris;cs	  that	  
vary	  over	  ;me	  
–  Diff-­‐in-­‐diff	  restricts	  confounding	  
unobserved	  characteris;cs	  to	  be	  
constant	  
Abadie,	  Diamond,	  and	  Hainmueller	  (2010)	  
The	  Synthe;c	  Control	  Method	  (SCM)	  
•  Example	  from	  Abadie,	  Diamond,	  and	  Hainmueller	  (2010)	  	  
–  Es;mate	  the	  impact	  of	  Proposi;on	  99	  on	  cigare>e	  sales	  in	  California	  
Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller: Synthetic Control Methods for Comparative Case Studies 499
programs in the 1989–2000 period and they are excluded from
the donor pool. We also discard all states that raised their state
cigarette taxes by 50 cents or more over the 1989 to 2000 pe-
riod (Alaska, Hawaii, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, New
York, Washington). Notice that, even if smaller tax increases
substantially reduced smoking in any of the control states that
gets assigned a positive weight in the synthetic control, this
should if anything attenuate the treatment effect estimate that
we obtain for California. Finally, we also exclude the District
of Columbia from our sample. Our donor pool includes the
remaining 38 states. Our results are robust, however, to the in-
clusion of the discarded states.
Our outcome variable of interest is annual per capita ciga-
rette consumption at the state level, measured in our dataset as
per capita cigarette sales in packs. We obtained these data from
Orzechowski and Walker (2005) where they are constructed us-
ing information on state-level tax revenues on cigarettes sales.
This is the most widely used indicator in the tobacco research
literature, available for a much longer time period than survey-
based measures of smoking prevalence. A disadvantage of tax-
revenue-based data relative to survey data on smoking preva-
lence is that the former are affected by cigarette smuggling
across tax jurisdictions. We discuss this issue later in this sec-
tion. We include in X1 and X0 the values of predictors of
smoking prevalence for California and the 38 potential con-
trols, respectively. Our predictors of smoking prevalence are:
average retail price of cigarettes, per capita state personal in-
come (logged), the percentage of the population age 15–24, and
per capita beer consumption. These variables are averaged over
the 1980–1988 period and augmented by adding three years of
lagged smoking consumption (1975, 1980, and 1988). Appen-
dix A provides data sources.
Using the techniques described in Section 2, we construct
a synthetic California that mirrors the values of the predictors
of cigarette consumption in California before the passage of
Proposition 99. We estimate the effect of Proposition 99 on per
capita cigarette consumption as the difference in cigarette con-
sumption levels between California and its synthetic versions
in the years after Proposition 99 was passed. We then perform a
series of placebo studies that confirm that our estimated effects
for California are unusually large relative to the distribution of
the estimate that we obtain when we apply the same analysis to
the states in the donor pool.
3.3 Results
Figure 1 plots the trends in per capita cigarette consumption
in California and the rest of the United States. As this figure
suggests, the rest of the United States may not provide a suit-
able comparison group for California to study the effects of
Proposition 99 on per capita smoking. Even before the passage
of Proposition 99 the time series of cigarette consumption in
California and in the rest of the United States differed notably.
Levels of cigarette consumption were similar in California and
the rest of the United States in the early 1970s. Trends began to
diverge in the late 1970s, when California’s cigarette consump-
tion peaked and began to decline while consumption in the rest
of the United States was still rising. Cigarette sales declined in
the 1980s, but with larger decreases in California than in the rest
of the United States. In 1988, the year Proposition 99 passed,
cigarette consumption was about 27% higher in the rest of the
Figure 1. Trends in per-capita cigarette sales: California vs. the rest
of the United States.
United States relative to California. Following the law’s pas-
sage, cigarette consumption in California continued to decline.
To evaluate the effect of Proposition 99 on cigarette smoking
in California, the central question is how cigarette consumption
would have evolved in California after 1988 in the absence of
Proposition 99. The synthetic control method provides a sys-
tematic way to estimate this counterfactual.
As explained above, we construct the synthetic California as
the convex combination of states in the donor pool that most
closely resembled California in terms of pre-Proposition 99 val-
ues of smoking prevalence predictors. The results are displayed
in Table 1, which compares the pretreatment characteristics of
the actual California with that of the synthetic California, as
well as with the population-weighted average of the 38 states
in the donor pool. We see that the average of states that did not
implement a large-scale tobacco-control program in 1989–2000
does not seem to provide a suitable control group for Califor-
nia. In particular, prior to the passage of Proposition 99 average
beer consumption and cigarette retail prices were lower in the
average of the 38 control states than in California. Moreover,
prior to the passage of Proposition 99 average cigarette sales
per capita were substantially higher on average in the 38 con-
Table 1. Cigarette sales predictor means
California
Average of
Variables Real Synthetic 38 control states
Ln(GDP per capita) 10.08 9.86 9.86
Percent aged 15–24 17.40 17.40 17.29
Retail price 89.42 89.41 87.27
Beer consumption per capita 24.28 24.20 23.75
Cigarette sales per capita 1988 90.10 91.62 114.20
Cigarette sales per capita 1980 120.20 120.43 136.58
Cigarette sales per capita 1975 127.10 126.99 132.81
NOTE: All variables except lagged cigarette sales are averaged for the 1980–1988 period
(beer consumption is averaged 1984–1988). GDP per capita is measured in 1997 dollars,
retail prices are measured in cents, beer consumption is measured in gallons, and cigarette
sales are measured in packs.
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trol states than in California. In contrast, the synthetic Califor-
nia accurately reproduces the values that smoking prevalence
and smoking prevalence predictor variables had in California
prior to the passage of Proposition 99.
Table 1 highlights an important feature of synthetic control
estimators. Similar to matching estimators, the synthetic con-
trol method forces the researcher to demonstrate the affinity be-
tween the region exposed to the intervention of interest and its
synthetic counterpart, that is, the weighted average of regions
chosen from the donor pool. As a result, the synthetic control
method safeguards against estimation of “extreme counterfactu-
als,” that is, those counterfactuals that fall far outside the convex
hull of the data (King and Zheng 2006). As explained in Sec-
tion 2.3, we chose V among all positive definite and diagonal
matrices to minimize the mean squared prediction error of per
capita cigarette sales in California during the pre-Proposition 99
period. The resulting value of the diagonal element of V asso-
ciated to the log GDP per capita variable is very small, which
indicates that, given the other variables in Table 1, log GDP
per capita does not have substantial power predicting the per
capita cigarette consumption in California before the passage
of Proposition 99. This explains the discrepancy between Cali-
fornia and its synthetic version in terms of log GDP per capita.
Table 2 displays the weights of each control state in the syn-
thetic California. The weights reported in Table 2 indicate that
smoking trends in California prior to the passage of Proposi-
tion 99 is best reproduced by a combination of Colorado, Con-
necticut, Montana, Nevada, and Utah. All other states in the
donor pool are assigned zero W-weights.
Figure 2 displays per capita cigarette sales for California and
its synthetic counterpart during the period 1970–2000. Notice
Table 2. State weights in the synthetic California
State Weight State Weight
Alabama 0 Montana 0.199
Alaska – Nebraska 0
Arizona – Nevada 0.234
Arkansas 0 New Hampshire 0
Colorado 0.164 New Jersey –
Connecticut 0.069 New Mexico 0
Delaware 0 New York –
District of Columbia – North Carolina 0
Florida – North Dakota 0
Georgia 0 Ohio 0
Hawaii – Oklahoma 0
Idaho 0 Oregon –
Illinois 0 Pennsylvania 0
Indiana 0 Rhode Island 0
Iowa 0 South Carolina 0
Kansas 0 South Dakota 0
Kentucky 0 Tennessee 0
Louisiana 0 Texas 0
Main 0 Utah 0.334
Maryl nd – Vermont 0
Massachusetts – Virginia 0
Michigan – Washington –
Minnesota 0 West Virginia 0
Mississippi 0 Wisconsin 0
Missouri 0 Wyoming 0
Figure 2. Trends in per-capita cigarette sales: California vs. syn-
thetic California.
that, in contrast to per capita sales in other U.S. states (shown
in Figure 1), per capita sales in the synthetic California very
closely track the trajectory of this variable in California for the
entire pre-Proposition 99 period. Combined with the high de-
gree of balance on all smoking predictors (Table 1), this sug-
gests that the synthetic California provides a sensible approxi-
mation to the number of cigarette packs per capita that would
have been sold in California in 1989–2000 in the absence of
Proposition 99.
Our estimate of the effect of Proposition 99 on cigarette con-
sumption in California is the difference between per capita ciga-
rette sales in California and in its synthetic version after the pas-
sage of Proposition 99. Immediately after the law’s passage, the
two lines begin to diverge noticeably. While cigarette consump-
tion in the synthetic California continued on its moderate down-
ward trend, the real California experienced a sharp decline. The
discrepancy between the two lines suggests a large negative ef-
fect of Proposition 99 on per capita cigarette sales. Figure 3
plots the yearly estimates of the impacts of Proposition 99, that
is, the yearly gaps in per capita cigarette consumption between
California and its synthetic counterpart. Figure 3 suggests that
Proposition 99 had a large effect on per capita cigarette sales,
and that this effect increased in time. The magnitude of the es-
timated impact of Proposition 99 in Figure 3 is substantial. Our
results suggest that for the entire 1989–2000 period cigarette
consumption was reduced by an average of almost 20 packs per
capita, a decline of approximately 25%.
In order to assess the robustness of our results, we included
additional predictors of smoking prevalence among the vari-
ables used to construct the synthetic control. Our results stayed
virtually unaffected regardless of which and how many predic-
tor variables we included. The list of predictors used for robust-
ness checks included state-level measures of unemployment,
income inequality, poverty, welfare transfers, crime rates, drug
related arrest rates, cigarette taxes, population density, and nu-
merous variables to capture the demographic, racial, and social
structure of states.
Donor	  Pool	  for	  Alaska	  
•  Important:	  Outcomes	  from	  donor	  pool	  states	  must	  be	  driven	  
by	  the	  same	  structural	  process	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  and	  not	  be	  subject	  to	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SCM:	  Inference	  
•  Placebo	  Tests:	  How	  ouen	  would	  we	  obtain	  results	  of	  this	  
magnitude	  if	  we	  had	  chosen	  a	  state	  at	  random	  rather	  than	  
Alaska?	  	  
•  Apply	  SCM	  on	  states	  in	  donor	  pool	  that	  did	  not	  receive	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Figure 3. Per-capita cigarette sales gap between California and syn-
thetic California.
Our analysis produces estimates of the effect of Proposi-
tion 99 that are considerably larger than those obtained by
Fichtenberg and Glantz (2000) using linear regression meth-
ods. In particular, Fichtenberg and Glantz (2000) estimate that
by 1997 Proposition 99 had reduced per capita cigarette sales in
California by about 14 packs per year. Our estimates increase
this figure substantially, to 24 packs per year. Part of this dif-
ference is likely to be explained by the fact that Fichtenberg
and Glantz (2000) use per capita cigarette sales in the rest of
the United States to reproduce how this variable would have
evolved in California in the absence of Proposition 99. As ex-
plained above, after the enactment of Proposition 99 in Califor-
nia, other states, like Massachusetts and Florida passed similar
tobacco control legislation. While we eliminate these states as
potential controls, Fichtenberg and Glantz (2000) do not do so,
which is likely to attenuate their estimates.
There are several ways in which the assumption of no in-
terference between units of Section 2 could be violated in the
context of our analysis of the effects of Proposition 99. In our
judgment, these potential violations do not appear to be se-
vere, and in some cases would likely attenuate the estimated
effect of Proposition 99. Perhaps the most important concern
in this regard is that the increase in anti-tobacco sentiment
created in California by Proposition 99 could have spread to
other states, contaminating the donor pool. Another concern is
that in response to Proposition 99 the tobacco industry could
have diverted funds from planned advertising campaigns in
other states to California. In both cases, interference would
likely cause lower levels of smoking in the control states, ar-
tificially reducing the magnitude of our estimate of the effect
of Proposition 99. On the other hand, it is possible that the rise
in tobacco taxes implemented under Proposition 99 increased
cigarette smuggling or cross-border purchases from nearby ju-
risdictions. However, Lovenheim (2008) and DeCicca, Kenkel,
and Liu (2008) provide evidence that large distances to lower
tobacco price jurisdictions keep the level of cross-border ciga-
rette purchases low in California. There is much less informa-
tion about organized smuggling, although it has been argued
that the extent of this activity in the U.S. is likely to be small
and in decline (e.g., Kleine 1993). An increase in the number of
cigarettes smuggled into California after the passage of Propo-
sition 99 would exacerbate our estimates. However, given the
large magnitude of the effects that we estimate in this article,
the increase in cigarettes smuggled into California after Propo-
sition 99 would have had to have been massive in order to ex-
plain our estimates.
3.4 Inference About the Effect of the California
Tobacco Control Program
To evaluate the significance of our estimates, we pose the
question of whether our results could be driven entirely by
chance. How often would we obtain results of this magnitude
if we had chosen a state at random for the study instead of Cali-
fornia? To answer this question, we use placebo tests. Similar to
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Bertrand, Duflo, and Mul-
lainathan (2004), we run placebo studies by applying the syn-
thetic control method to states that did not implement a large-
scale tobacco control program during the sample period of our
study. If the placebo studies create gaps of magnitude similar to
the one estimated for California, then our interpretation is that
our analysis does not provide significant evidence of a nega-
tive effect of Proposition 99 on cigarette sales in California. If,
on the other hand, the placebo studies show that the gap esti-
mated for California is unusually large relative to the gaps for
the states that did not implement large-scale tobacco control
program, then our interpretation is that our analysis provides
significant evidence of a negative effect of Proposition 99 on
cigarette sales in California.
To assess the significance of our estimates, we conduct a
series of placebo studies by iteratively applying the synthetic
control method used to estimate the effect of Proposition 99 in
California to every other state in the donor pool. In each iter-
ation we reassign in our data the tobacco control intervention
to one of the 38 control states, shifting California to the donor
pool. That is, we proceed as if one of the states in the donor
pool would have passed a large-scale tobacco control program
in 1988, instead of California. We then compute the estimated
effect associated with each placebo run. This iterative proce-
dure provides us with a distribution of estimated gaps for the
states where no intervention took place.
Figure 4 displays the results for the placebo test. The gray
lines represent the gap associated with each of the 38 runs of
the test. That is, the gray lines show the difference in per capita
cigarette sales between each state in the donor pool and its re-
spective synthetic version. The superimposed black line denotes
the gap estimated for California. As the figure makes apparent,
the estimated gap for California during the 1989–2000 period
is unusually large relative to the distribution of the gaps for the
states in the donor pool.
As Figure 4 indicates, the synthetic method provides an
excellent fit for per capita cigarette sales in California prior
to the passage of Proposition 99. The preintervention mean
squared prediction error (MSPE) in California (the average of
the squared discrepancies between per capita cigarette sales in
California and in its synthetic counterpart during the period
1970–1988) is about 3. The pre-Proposition 99 median MSPE
among the 38 states in the donor pool is about 6, also quite
small, indicating that the synthetic control method is able to
502 Journal of the American Statistical Association, June 2010
Figure 4. Per-capita cigarette sales gaps in California and placebo
gaps in all 38 control states.
provide good fit for per capi a cigarette consumption pr or
to Proposi ion 99 for the majority of the stat s in the onor
pool. However, Figure 4 indicate also that per capita cigarette
sales during the 1970–1988 period cannot be well reproduced
for some states by a convex combination of pe capita ciga-
rette sales in other states. The state with worst fit in the pre-
Proposition 99 period is New H mpshire, with a MSPE of 3437.
The large MSPE for New Hampshire does not come as a sur-
prise. Among all the states in the donor pool, New Hampshire
is the state with the highest per capita cigarette sales for every
year prior to the passage of Proposition 99. Therefore, there is
no combination of states in our sample that can reproduce the
time series of per capita cigarette sales in New Hampshire prior
to 1988. Similar problems arise for other states with extreme
values of per capita cigarette sales during the pre-Proposition 99
period.
If the synthetic California had failed to fit per capita ciga-
rette sales for the real California in the years before the pas-
sage of Proposition 99, we would have interpreted that much
of the post-1988 gap between the real and the synthetic Cal-
ifornia was also artificially created by lack of fit, rather than
by the effect of Proposition 99. Similarly, placebo runs with
poor fit prior to the passage of Proposition 99 do not provide
information to measure the relative rarity of estimating a large
post-Proposition 99 gap for a state that was well fitted prior
to Proposition 99. For this reason, we provide several different
versions of Figure 4, each version excluding states beyond a
certain level of pre-Proposition 99 MSPE.
Figure 5 excludes states that had a pre-Proposition 99 MSPE
of more than 20 times the MSPE of California. This is a very
lenient cutoff, discarding only four states with extreme values
of pre-Proposition 99 MSPE for which the synthetic method
would be clearly ill-advised. In this figure there remain a few
lines that still deviate substantially from the zero gap line in the
pre-Proposition 99 period. Among the 35 states remaining in
the figure, the California gap line is now about the most unusual
line, especially from the mid-1990s onward.
Figure 5. Per-capita cigarette sales gaps in California and placebo
gaps in 34 control states (discards states with pre-Proposition 99
MSPE twenty times higher than California’s).
Figure 6 is based on a lower cutoff, excluding all states that
had a pre-Proposition 99 MSPE of more than five times the
MSPE of California. Twenty-nine control states plus California
remain in the figure. The California gap line is now clearly the
most unusual line for almost the entire post-treatment period.
In Figure 7 we lower the cutoff even further and focus
exclusively on those states that we can fit almost as well
as California in the period 1970–1988, that is, those states
with pre-Proposition 99 MSPE not higher than twice the pre-
Proposition 99 MSPE for California. Evaluated against the dis-
tribution of the gaps for the 19 remaining control states in Fig-
ure 7, the gap for California appears highly unusual. The nega-
tive effect in California is now by far the lowest of all. Because
this figure includes 19 control states, the probability of estimat-
Figure 6. Per-capita cigarette sales gaps in California and placebo
gaps in 29 control states (discards states with pre-Proposition 99
MSPE five times higher than California’s).















































Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis















































Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis
Synthetic Control for Index of Mining GDP
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Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis
Placebo Comparison: Mining GDP



















































Source: Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages
















































Source: Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages
Synthetic Control for Mining Employment














































Source: Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages















































Source: Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages
Placebo Comparison: Mining Employment
Impact	  of	  ACES	  on	  Alaska	  Oil	  Produc;on:	  




































































Source: US Energy Information Administration


































































Source: US Energy Information Administration
Placebo Comparison: Crude Oil Production
Impact	  of	  ACES	  on	  Alaska	  Development	  Well	  	  








































































Source: American Petroleum Institute






































































Source: American Petroleum Institute
Placebo Comparison: Development Wells
Impact	  of	  ACES	  on	  Alaska	  Exploratory	  Well	  	  









































































Source: American Petroleum Institute






































































Source: American Petroleum Institute
Placebo Comparison: Exploratory Wells
Conclusion	  
•  Results:	  No	  discernable	  difference	  between	  Alaska	  and	  its	  
synthe;c	  control	  post-­‐ACES.	  
–  Supported	  by	  results	  from	  diff-­‐in-­‐diff	  aproach	  
–  Suggests	  that	  ACES	  had	  a	  minimal	  effect	  on	  the	  overall	  Alaskan	  
economy	  between	  2007	  and	  2011	  
–  Arguments	  used	  to	  support	  SB	  21	  are	  not	  supported	  by	  our	  results	  
How	  would	  have	  Alaskan	  oil	  ac.vity	  evolved	  since	  
2007	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  ACES?	  	  	  
Conclusion:	  Limita;ons	  
•  Shale	  boom	  shock	  in	  all	  other	  U.S.	  energy	  states	  
–  Violates	  the	  assump;on	  that	  donor	  pool	  states	  follow	  the	  same	  
structural	  process	  with	  no	  structural	  shocks	  during	  sample	  period	  
•  What	  our	  synthe;c	  Alaska	  is	  really	  es;ma;ng:	  
–  What	  Alaska	  would	  have	  looked	  like	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  ACES	  and	  in	  the	  
presence	  of	  a	  shale	  boom	  
•  Reason	  to	  believe	  our	  results:	  
–  Shale	  boom	  should	  reinforce	  the	  impact	  of	  ACES,	  and	  yet	  we	  s;ll	  do	  not	  
see	  a	  significant	  effect	  
–  This	  is	  the	  correct	  counterfactual	  if	  we	  believe	  ACES	  prevented	  the	  
shale	  boom	  from	  migra;ng	  to	  Alaska	  (lots	  of	  shale	  opportunity	  in	  AK)	  
Conclusion:	  Limita;ons	  
•  Only	  a	  5	  year	  window	  to	  evaluate	  the	  impact	  of	  ACES	  
–  If	  oil	  producing	  firms	  are	  only	  responsive	  to	  fiscal	  policy	  in	  the	  long-­‐run,	  
then	  we	  fail	  to	  capture	  the	  long-­‐run	  impact	  of	  ACES	  
	  
•  Relevant	  counterfactual	  may	  be:	  what	  would	  the	  State	  of	  
Alaska	  look	  like	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  ACES	  10	  or	  20	  years	  from	  
now?	  	  
–  A	  more	  structural	  approach	  needed	  
•  Alaska	  is	  a	  unique	  state:	  
–  Difficult	  to	  create	  a	  synthe;c	  state	  that	  resembles	  Alaska	  
–  Rela;vely	  poor	  pre-­‐interven;on	  fit	  from	  some	  outcomes	  
–  If	  Alaska	  is	  unlike	  any	  other	  state,	  how	  can	  we	  es;mate	  a	  counterfactual	  
Alaska	  under	  a	  set	  of	  different	  policies?	  
	  
Weigh;ng	  Matrix	  









Colorado 0.398 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Kansas 0.000 0.000 0.056 0.000 0.000 
Louisiana 0.000 0.000 0.236 .000 0.000 
Mississippi 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Montana 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.475 
New Mexico 0.000 0.732 0.000 0.000 0.271 
North Dakota 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Oklahoma 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Texas 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.948 0.000 
Utah 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.052 0.254 
West Virginia 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Wyoming 0.602 0.268 0.708 0.000 0.000 
